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This paper is a contribution to the debate over optimum human population.
More precisely, the topic of debate is the optimal medium-term instantaneous
population size: the optimal number of human beings for there to be living on
Earth at any one time, over the next few decades or so.
The considerations relevant to this question are many and various, and I will
not attempt anything like a comprehensive survey of them here.1 But one
highly relevant set of considerations relates to anthropogenic climate change.
The paper attempts to clarify whether, and if so precisely why, climate change
generates reasons for favouring a reduction in instantaneous population size,
relative to natural choices of status quo. I will argue that the usual arguments
for this conclusion are too simplistic: in particular, they ignore the fact that (in
a precisely specifiable sense) climate change depends on cumulative emissions
across all time, rather than on emissions rates per se. The same conclusion
can plausibly be supported once that fact is accounted for, but the relevant
arguments are more complex (and less conclusive).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the usual simple argument
for the claim that, because of climate change, a lower instantaneous population
would be better. This argument is based on the very natural thought that since
emissions are made by people, having fewer people would naturally lead to lower
emissions. The argument, however, essentially gives centre stage to the notion
of emissions rates. Section 3 notes the sense in which climate change depends
primarily on cumulative emissions, rather than on emissions rates. Section 4
introduces a way of conceptualising what we would be doing if we reduced
instantaneous population sizes, in terms of spreading out a given number of
lives over a longer stretch of time (what I will call ‘population spreading’). By
1I attempt a partial survey in (Greaves, 2018).
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thinking in this way, we see that it is far from obvious that population reduction
would reduce cumulative emissions, and hence (given the points of section 3)
far from obvious that it would in the end generate any improvement. Using the
notion of population spreading, I set out a simple model of what the effects of
population reduction might be such that (I claim) if this simple model were
accurate, reducing instantaneous population sizes would in fact not help with
climate change at all.
In section 5, I survey two possible reasons one might have for doubting this
conditional claim: for thinking, that is, that even if the simple model were
accurate, still population reduction would help with climate change. In each
case, I argue that the reasons in question are confused (either because they
rely essentially on a false theory of value, or because they do not in the end
have the claimed implication). Section 6 turns to the question of whether the
assumptions of the simple model are correct. I argue there that two of the
simple model’s assumptions are likely to be importantly inaccurate, and that
because of this, population reduction probably would, in the end, help with
climate change. The key issues concern (i) ways in which population reduction
might reduce even cumulative emissions, and (ii) ways in which merely slowing
down the course of climate change, even if it did not correspond to reducing
the extent of the climate change that eventually occurs, could be beneficial
(because of the nature of various possible processes of adaptation). The aim of
the paper is to focus attention and debate onto these key issues, and away from
the too-simplistic idea that “fewer people means less greenhouse gas emission”.
2 The emissions-rate argument for population re-
duction
Climate change, as is well known, is driven by emissions of various greenhouse
gases (GHGs). And GHG emissions rates are on the increase. Prior to the
industrial revolution, emissions were (relatively speaking) extremely low; by
1970 the total global emissions rate had reached the equivalent2 of 27 billion
tons of CO2 annually; by 2010 the rate had reached 49 billion tons per year,
2There are many different greenhouse gases — carbon dioxide is the biggest contributor
to climate change, but by no means the only contributor — and these gases differ from
one another over (crucially) their time-profiles of contribution to radiative forcing per unit
mass of gas. For example, carbon dioxide is relatively long-lived in the atmosphere, and
consequently contributes very significantly to radiative forcing over a timescale of hundreds
of years; methane contributes more forcing per unit mass initially, but is much shorter-lived
in the atmosphere. As a result, there is no single canonical way of representing the relevant
multidimensional facts on a single real-valued scale (that is, no single canonical ‘emissions
metric’). The figures quoted in the main text follow the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report in
using the ‘GWP100’ emissions metric, which quantifies emissions based on their cumulative
contributions to radiative forcing over the first 100-year period (IPCC, 2014b, box TS.5).
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and this emissions growth is expected to persist for some time (IPCC, 2014b,
pp.45-49). As a result of these emissions, climate models predict, the world is
likely to experience a surface warming of between about 1.5 and 4◦C by 2100,
and possibly further significant increases beyond that date. The early stages of
this warming have already been observed (IPCC, 2013, esp. pp.37, 89).
What causes this rise in emissions rates? Commentators vary somewhat in their
tendency to point the finger of blame at increasing average GDP per capita, or
instead at increasing population sizes. Both are of course contributors, at least in
the purely arithmetical sense that the total emissions rate is given by (average
GDP per capita) × (population size) × (emissions intensity of GDP). (This
equation is a condensed form of the Kaya identity; see e.g. (IPCC, 2014b, box
5.1).) And, at the global level3, both of the first two factors in this product are
increasing.4 Over the period 1970-2010, for instance, the global average GDP
per capita rose by 103%, and the global poulation size rose by 87% (IPCC,
2014b, p.365); both are expected to continue rising (at least) well into the
present century ((IPCC, 2014b, figure TS.7),(Nations, 2017, figure 2)). For
present purposes, though, we need not single out one of these factors as ‘the
culprit’ to the exclusion of the other: holding fixed the remaining factors in the
Kaya identity, a given proportional increase in either equally increases the total
emissions rate by the same proportion. Insofar as we have a goal of reducing
the total emissions rate, then, reducing population size looks like at least one
sensible thing to try.
This general line of thought is outlined by (among others) Jonathan Porritt, in
his ‘call to arms’ for population reduction5,6:
3There are of course significant regional variations in each of the three factors. But con-
sideration of the global averages will suffice for the purposes of this paper.
4The (global average) emissions intensity of GDP, meanwhile, is decreasing. This offsets
the increases in GDP per capita and in population size to some degree, but not enough to
prevent the total global emissions rate from increasing IPCC (2014b, p.365).
5I focus on Porritt’s version of the argument for concreteness and because Porritt sets
the argument out more clearly than most, but the basic line of thought is often heard. In
particular, my guess is that this is what many authors have in mind (whether or not the
authors are willing explicitly to draw conclusions about the desirability of population control)
when they claim that that population growth, via its contribution to rising emissions rates,
is one of the key drivers of climate change (see e.g. (IPCC, 2014b),(Royal Society, 2012,
p.68),(Population Matters, 2016)).
6Here and throughout, the relevant sense of ‘population reduction’ is counterfactual rather
than temporal. For instance: according to the United Nations’ ‘medium’ population projec-
tion, population will grow from 7.3 billion in 2015 to 9.7 billion in 2050. According to the
‘low’ projection, meanwhile, population in 2050 will rise to only 8.7 billion (United Nations,
2015). The ‘low’ scenario counts as population reduction relative to the medium scenario,
notwithstanding the fact that even according to the low scenario, population in 2050 is higher
than in 2015.
Porritt’s reference to a ‘downward population trajectory’ (quoted below) seems to be tem-
poral in the first instance, but since the implied contrast is presumably a state of affairs in
which the population trajectory is not a downward one, the counterfactual interpretation is
valid here too.
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At one level, this is all about basic mathematics. We roughly know
the total volume of greenhouse gases we can put into the atmosphere
over the next few decades if we are to stay the right side of the
two-degree-centigrade increase (by the end of the century) which
scientists tell us we absolutely mustn’t go above. That total volume
has to be divided up between the total number of people doing the
emitting. . . I believe it’s part of our duty to the next generation. . .
to advance the compassionate, progressive case for a full-on global
campaign to put the world on a downward population trajectory just
as fast as we can.(Porritt, 2010)
In fact, Porritt’s argument is open to two quite different interpretations. Both
start from the crucial claim that, for some fixed R, in order to avert dangerous
climate change we need to stay below total emission rate R. Thereafter, the two
interpretations diverge. The first emphasises that life over the next few decades
can be more pleasant given a lower population, consistently with averting dan-
gerous climate change: the total emission rate R ‘has to be divided up between
the total number of people doing the emitting’, so that we each get a larger
share (and thus arguably a better life) if there are fewer others around for us to
share with. The second emphasises instead that it is not a foregone conclusion
we will succeed in averting dangerous climate change, and that this becomes
more likely under lower-population scenarios (due to the difficulties involved in
significantly reducing per capita emissions).
For either version of Porritt’s argument to work, however, it is essential that
the key to averting dangerous climate change is reducing the emissions rate (or,
more or less equivalently, reducing total emissions within some fixed number of
decades: in particular, it must be the same number of decades that is relevant
across scenarios that differ from one another over the path of instantaneous
population size). Porritt and his fellow-travellers seem to be thinking that the
crucial period for emissions is, say, between now and 2050, regardless of how
many people live during that time. But in fact the timing of emissions has only
a rather limited significance. To see this, we need a brief excursion into the
relevant climate science.7
7One might try to be more charitable: perhaps Porritt is relying on fact that the ‘carbon
budget’ that we must stay within, for the purpose of averting dangerous climate change, will
be used up within a few decades whether or not we achieve population reduction. Given that
fact, it is indeed the case that ‘we roughly know the total volume of greenhouse gases we
can put into the atmosphere over the next few decades’ if we are to avert dangerous climate
change. However — as I will argue in this paper — unless this translates somehow into a fixed
cap on the total emissions rate, it takes a lot more than ‘basic mathematics’ to establish that
‘putting the world on a downward population trajectory’ would help.
Similarly, one might be interested only in emissions within the next few decades if one
thought that due to exogenous technical progress, emissions will be effectively zero after
(say) 2070 in any case. But technical progress is due to work carried out by people; it is
therefore implausible that the rate of technical progress is exogenous in the relevant sense
(i.e., independent of instantaneous population sizes). I investigate the effect of population
size on technical progress rate in (slightly) more depth in section 6.1.
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3 Cumulative emissions
An emissions pathway is an assignment of total global emissions rates to times.
Climate science seeks, among other things, to predict which emissions pathways
would lead to which temperature pathways: assignments of global mean surface
temperatures to times. Given realistic climate science, together with the fact
that total cumulative emissions are limited by the amount of fossil fuel in the
ground, one expects that for any possible emissions pathway, the temperature
pathway will consist of ascent to a peak, followed by (eventually) a decline.
The key finding from climate science ((Matthews & Caldeira, 2008; Allen et al.,
2009; Eby et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009; Zickfeld et al., 2009)) is that8
(CE-PH) Peak warming is, to a very good approximation, deter-
mined by cumulative emissions alone, i.e. independently of any other
details of the emissions pathway.
The observation (CE-PH) is highly significant for policy purposes. It means
that merely slowing down the rate at which we (collectively) burn fossil fuels
will not be enough to avert dangerous climate change; what we crucially need is
eventually to get to the point of near-zero carbon emissions (so that cumulative
emissions are finite), and to do so while significant fossil fuel reserves remain
in the ground (so that cumulative emissions are sufficiently small to limit cli-
mate change to a reasonable extent).9 Thus it suggests that policies should
ultimately be favoured on the basis of the extent (if any) to which they increase
the probability of this desirable eventual outcome; effects on emissions rates are
of interest only insofar as they are plausibly related to that ultimate goal.
As a special case of this, (CE-PH) is highly significant to the optimum pop-
ulation debate. For, as I will elaborate in the next section, it suggests that
8The focus on peak warming is particularly prominent in (Allen et al., 2009). What the
literature establishes more generally is that a broad range of climate responses to emissions
(including not only the peaks but also the whole pathways for atmospheric CO2 concentration,
global mean surface temperature, ocean acidity, and other relevant variables) depend on cu-
mulative emissions alone, and are in this sense path-independent, in the long term. (Of course
there is path-dependence in the short term: for example, holding fixed cumulative emissions,
the number of degrees of warming experienced in 2050 obviously depends on how much of
that fixed total is emitted before vs. after 2050.) This generality is relevant for the present
paper, since it implies that some ways of caring about variables other than peak warming will
fail to generate any reason to care about instantaneous population size. Nevertheless, in this
paper I focus on the claim (CE-PH), for simplicity of exposition.
This path-independence is perhaps unsurprising, given the very long lifetime of CO2 in the
atmosphere ((Archer, 2005)), and the fact that the literature is only considering variations to
the emissions path on a much shorter timescale (tens or hundreds of years).
9Negative net carbon emissions could in principle be achieved by widespread use of ‘carbon
capture and storage’ technology, driven by non-carbon energy sources. This means, inter alia,
that an eventual return to low cumulative net emissions is in principle consistent with burning
all the fossil fuel. I leave this complication aside for simplicity of exposition.
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(say) halving instantaneous population might well not help at all with climate
change if it merely resulted in us taking twice as long to emit the same cu-
mulative emissions. Pace the emissions-rate argument, (CE-PH) implies that
insofar as our concern is to limit peak warming, our concern should not be with
the total amount of carbon we emit over the next few decades, but rather the
total amount of carbon we emit ever. (Relatedly, it is unclear why we should
be fixated specifically on avoiding a temperature increase of more than 2 ◦C by
the end of the century, rather than seeking to limit the height of the warming
peak to (say) 2◦C whenever it occurs.) To put it another way: it is unclear
whether there is any value to reducing the global emissions rate, if this is done
via population reduction.
4 Population reduction as population spreading
The purpose of the present section is to introduce a concept that will prove
helpful for clarifying the question of whether and how population reduction
might help with climate change, given the pre-eminent significance of cumula-
tive emissions. This is the concept of population spreading (more precisely —
a refinement I will introduce in section 4.3 — mere emissions-era population
spreading).
4.1 Population spreading
Let A be any state of affairs (in the timeless sense, i.e. a complete history of
the universe, from big bang to heat death). The specification of A includes
information about how many individuals are alive at each time and their per-
capita emissions levels at each time, and thus determines (inter alia) a particular
emissions pathway and thence a particular temperature pathway.
Let us now define a second state of affairs B, which differs from A as follows.
There is a bijection10 pi from the set of persons who ever exist in A to the set
of persons who ever exist in B, such that:
• pi preserves life lengths. That is, for every person x who exists in A, the
life that x lives in A and the life that pi(x) lives in B are equally long.
• pi respects the birth order. That is, for all persons x, y who ever exist in
A, if x is born before y in A, then pi(x) is born before pi(y) in B.
10We of course expect that the identities of persons in B are different from those in A; but
we need not dwell on this fact, because we assume that bare identities of persons are morally
irrelevant for present purposes.
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• There is some fixed date D (e.g., 2017) such that (i) A and B are qualita-
tively identical before D11, and (ii) for all individuals x, y who are born
after D in A, the interval between the births of pi(x) and pi(y) in B is
longer than the interval between the births of x and y in A.
When these conditions obtain, say that B is related to A by population spreading.
Heuristically, the idea is that what one does, in ‘moving’ from A to B, is to spread
people out more thinly across the decades. Thus the instantaneous population
at any given time (after D) is smaller in B than in A, but the timeless population
(the set of people who ever exist) is the same. There is one (instantaneous) sense
in which a transition from A to B involves reducing population size, and another
(timeless) sense in which it does not.
Now suppose further that
• pi preserves individual lifetime carbon emissions. That is, for all persons
x who exist in A, the lifetime carbon emissions of x in A are equal to the
lifetime carbon emissions of pi(x) in B.
When this further condition also obtains, say that B is related to A by mere
population spreading. Note that whenever this relation obtains, A and B have
the same cumulative emissions as one another. Although B in one sense has a
lower population than A, this way of reducing population size would not reduce
cumulative emissions.12
4.2 A simple model
Consider the following three conditions:
(MPS) Reducing instantaneous population size would implement mere popu-
lation spreading.
(CE-PH) Peak warming is determined by cumulative emissions alone.
(PH-CI) Climate-change impacts are a function of peak warming alone.
11It follows (given our assumption that pi respects the birth order) that pi is the identity
map before D.
12Note also that the conditions specified here are consistent with the time-profile of instan-
taneous population size in A being e.g. as in the UN medium projection, and in B being as
in the UN low projection.
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I do not assert these conditions; section 6 will examine how plausible each of
them is (and, indeed, will argue against the first and third conditions). But, as
a step towards clarifying the debate, it is useful to consider what follows on the
assumption that these conditions all hold.
What follows from the conditions (MPS), (CE-PH) and (PH-CI) jointly — since
mere population spreading does not affect cumulative emissions — is that reduc-
ing instantaneous population size would not reduce climate-change impacts13,
and in this sense would not ‘help with climate change’. 14 Although B has a
lower instantaneous population and consequently a lower emissions rate than A,
this way of achieving a reduction in emissions rate is not one that considerations
of climate change would give us any reason to welcome.
4.3 Emissions-era population spreading
It is worth making one refinement to the simple model of section 4.2. The issue
is that as I have defined ‘mere population spreading’, that concept applies only
when the ‘spreading’ in question does not affect the number of people who ever
live (it does not, that is, affect the ‘timeless population size’). However, (1) it
is very implausible that a reduction in instantaneous population size would not
affect the timeless population size15, and (2) this feature is anyway inessential
to the simple model. In this section, I will therefore define a weaker notion of
population spreading, which does not have this unwanted condition built into
the definition.
Given the finitude of fossil fuel reserves, there will eventually come a date beyond
which no significant further net carbon emissions will be made. Let tend be such
13It is not immediately clear precisely what sort of thing counts as an ‘impact’; I return to
this in section 5.
14This is of course not to say that B is not better overall than A: climate change is not
the only influence on overall value. In fact, I have not specified the relationship between
A and B precisely enough to determine which, if either, is better: it is consistent with my
specification, for instance, that there is a major world war in the 22nd century A but not in
B, or vice versa. I am assuming only that a contribution from ‘climate change impacts’ can
be meaningfully separated from any unrelated other ways in which A and B may differ. More
importantly, I am also assuming that ‘climate change impacts’ can be meaningfully separated
from other value-relevant ways caused by population spreading in which A and B differ. The
latter question is of course relevant to the question of whether population spreading would
make things better or worse overall; I return to it briefly in the concluding section of this
paper.
15It is unclear whether a short-to-medium-term reduction in instantaneous population size
would increase, or instead decrease, the size of the timeless population; there are plausible
considerations pointing in each direction. I return to this matter briefly in section 7. But
it would take an inexplicable coincidence for the effect (even: the effect on expected timeless
population size) to be zero.
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a date. Let us refer to the period from the present16 to tend as the ‘emissions
era’.
Again, let A be any ‘status quo’ state of affairs. Now let B be related to A by
spreading people out more thinly across time during the emissions era, but let us
assume nothing about how B is related to A, in particular as regards population
sizes, at later times. That is, suppose that there is some bijection pi from a subset
of A’s (timeless) population to a subset of B’s (timeless) population, such that
• All persons who exist during the emissions era in either A or B are in
(respectively) the domain or range of pi.
• pi respects the birth order.
• pi increases birth spacing.
When these conditions obtain, say that B is related to A by emissions-era
population spreading. If (further) pi preserves lifetime carbon emissions, say
that B is related to A by mere emissions-era population spreading.
The point is then that the simple model of section 4.2 works just as well if the
condition (MPS) is replaced by the weaker condition (MPS-EE):
(MPS-EE): Reducing instantaneous population size would implement mere
emissions-era population spreading.
Since it follows from (MPS-EE) that reducing instantaneous population size
would (to a very close approximation) leave cumulative emissions unaffected,
the claim that reducing instantaneous population size would not reduce climate
impacts goes through (to a very close approximation) just as before.
4.4 Physical time and population time
The following conceptual apparatus will be helpful to the discussion. Let us
distinguish between physical time on the one hand, and what we might call
population time on the other. Physical time is the time we are all familiar with,
and that is measured by standard clocks: one physical year passes each time
the Earth completes one revolution around the Sun, one physical second passes
16A more principled definition would identify, say, the start of the industrial revolution,
rather than the present, as the start of the ‘emissions era’. However, for present decision
purposes there is no point in considering counterfactual variations to the past, thus defining
the ‘emissions era’ as beginning at the present moment will serve our present purposes.
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while a light ray travels 3 x 108 metres in a vacuum, and so on. Population time
– I hereby stipulate – is a modification of physical time, where the modification is
based on instantaneous population size: let the number of seconds of population
time that pass between any two given instants be equal (by definition) to the
number of physical seconds elapsed multiplied by the instantaneous population
size during the interval in question.17 Thus, for example, if the instantaneous
population is smaller in state of affairs B than in state of affairs A, then the
rate at which the population clock ticks (relative to the physical clock) is lower
in state of affairs A than in state of affairs B.
This notion of population time will allow us to frame the issues in more il-
luminating ways. For example, Porritt is quick to note the obvious fact that
reducing instantaneous population size (while holding fixed per-capita emis-
sions) reduces the total global emissions rate relative to physical time. But for
all that, it could easily have no effect on the total global emissions rate relative
to population time. One question, therefore, is which of these rates (if either)
is positively correlated with expected cumulative emissions, or is via any other
route positively correlated with expected climate impacts. And this is an open
question: nothing that we have surveyed so far gives us any reason to think
that the physical-time rate is more relevant than the population-time rate in
either of these senses. Certainly, nothing in Porritt argument itself even begins
to address the question.
To summarise and preview: using the notion of (mere emissions-era) population
spreading (sections 4.1 and 4.3), I have set out a simple model of what the
consequences of reducing population size could conceivably be (section 4.2),
and made the conditional claim that if the assumptions of that simple model
were correct, then reducing population size would not help with climate change.
The next section examines and defends the conditional claim, while section 6
investigates the plausibility of the model’s assumptions.
5 Intrinsic reasons for favouring a physical-time
slowdown?
I noted in section 4 that as a matter of logic, it follows from the assumptions of
the simple model that reducing instantaneous population size would not ‘reduce
climate impacts’. But the term ‘climate impacts’ has so far been merely a
placeholder.
17More precisely: dtpop := N(t)·dtphys, where tphys is physical time, tpop is population time
and, as before, N(t) is instantaneous population size at t. (‘The’ instantaneous population
size during an interval of time is of course not in general well-defined, so the definition-sketch
given in the main text does not strictly speaking make sense.)
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We might most naturally take ‘impacts’ to be medium-scale physical changes
that affect the quality of individual lives: changes in, for example, sea level,
frequencies of droughts and floods, and the geographical distribution of various
diseases.18 If so, then ‘impacts’ are, roughly, things that affect the average
well-being of persons who live at the time and place at which the impact in
question occurs. And in that case, it does not immediately follow that reducing
population size would not make things better for reasons related to climate
change. We should distinguish, conceptually, between ‘would not reduce climate
impacts’ and ‘would not generate any climate-related improvement’.
One way in which these two notions can come apart involves axiologies that,
intuitively, assign intrinsic importance to matters of physical time: axiologies
according to which it matters not only how many lives are lived and how good
those lives are, but also when these lives (and components of these lives) are
lived, relative to the physical clock. In this section, I will briefly survey two such
axiologies, and the way in which each could be used to argue that even if climate
impacts (in the above sense) were unaffected, still the results of population
spreading would count as making things better.
Both arguments are unsound. I survey these arguments only to set them aside,
and to move on to more promising arguments in section 6.
5.1 First bad argument: via Instantaneous Averagism
5.1.1 Instantaneous averagism
The first argument I will consider proceeds by assuming a particular axiology,
which I will call ‘instantaneous averagism’. This takes a bit of setting up.
Ultimately, we normally want to work with axiologies that take as input the
data on how well each person’s life goes as a whole — the person’s lifetime
well-being level — and that output an index of the overall goodness of the
18This appears to be the way the IPCC uses the term ‘impacts’. The IPCC’s official account
is as follows:
In this report, the term impacts is used primarily to refer to the effects on
natural and human systems of extreme weather and climate events and cli-
mate change. Impacts generally refer to effects on lives, livelihoods, health,
ecosystems, economies, societies, cultures, services, and infrastructure due to
the interaction of climate changes or hazardous climate events occurring within
a specified time period and the vulnerability of an exposed society or system.
IPCC (2014a, p. 5)
The validity of the argument from (1) the simple model’s assumptions to (2) the conclusion
that reducign population size would not reduce climate impacts is of course independent of
the interpretation of ‘impacts’, provided that the interpretation is the same in the premises
and the conclusion.
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state of affairs.19 In the context of real-world applications, however, it is often
convenient to work in the first instance with data about instantaneous well-
being levels, corresponding to the matter of how well people’s lives are going at
a particular instant. Correspondingly, we might seek (in the first instance) an
account of how good a given state of affairs is at a particular moment in time.
On at least one natural approach20, the answer to that question is determined
by an average of how well individuals’ lives are going at the time in question.







where, for each state of affairs x and time t, P (x, t) is the set of persons who
exist at time t in state of affairs x, and winsti (x, t) is the instantaneous well-being
level that person i enjoys at time t in state of affairs x.
Even if we are working with such ‘instantaneous axiologies’, for decision purposes
we ultimately need to compare timeless states of affairs. 21 Thus, an instan-
taneous axiology is decision-relevant only insofar as it is related to a timeless
axiology. One natural proposal for such a relation takes the goodness of a time-
less state of affairs to be represented by the sum of its instantaneous goodness









Thus we arrive at the axiology of interest: goodness is equal to the sum-over-
times of average instantaneous well-being. Call this axiology instantaneous av-
eragism.23
19Or, at least: an index of how good the state of affairs is vis-a-vis considerations of
welfare. Welfarism is the view that goodness is entirely determined by welfare, but one need
not believe welfarism to think that an index of welfarist goodness is at least one important
input to assessments of overall goodness. Here, I consider only welafist goodness, for simplicity
(thus I don’t consider, for example, any evaluative significance that might attach to intact
ecosystems, over and above their contributions to welfare).
20This is of course not the only possible approach. For instance, one might well consider
the total instantaneous well-being at each point in time, rather than the average. I return to
this possibilty below (section 5.2).
21To base decisions at t only a comparison of alternative possible states of affairs at t would
be to ignore the effects of our actions on goings-on at later times; and once we seek to take
the latter into account, we will face questions of trade-offs between benefits and costs felt
at different times. A method for resolving these tradeoffs generates comparisons of timeless
states of affairs.
22More precisely—since time is continuous—by the time-integral of instantaneous goodness:
VIA(x) =
´





23Hurka (1982a) discusses this axiology under the label ‘A2’.
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If we assume instantaneous averagism, we might reason as follows. Even if
merely slowing down climate change relative to (physical) time fails to reduce
‘climate impacts’ in the sense that for every damaging climate-change related
event (every storm, or flood, or drought, etc.) in A, a precisely similar event
occurs at some time in B, the fact that these damaging events generally occur
at later times in B amounts to an improvement. That (we might argue) is
because what we do, in spreading out the process of climate change over a
longer stretch of time, is increase the length of time during which humanity is
able to enjoy the relatively benign climate conditions that precede the warming
peak, correspondingly reducing the length of time during which humanity has
to suffer the relatively blighted post-peak climate conditions.
As it stands, this argument is very rough. Its basic idea could be made precise
in various ways. However, we need not concern ourselves with the details of
that task; the important thing to notice is that the instantaneous-averagist
axiology is completely implausible, so that any argument that relies essentially
on instantaneous averagism is anyway unsound. The next section argues for
this implausibility claim.
5.1.2 Against instantaneous averagism
In fact, averagist population axiologies are implausible in general. For example,
the timeless averagist axiology, according to which the overall goodness of a
(timeless) state of affairs is given by the average of the lifetime well-being levels
of all persons who ever exist in that state of affairs, itself has deep problems24,
which are shared by instantaneous averagism’s way of valuing instantaneous
states of affairs. However, there are also deeper problems with instantaneous
averagism.
The deeper problems arise from the fact that according to this axiology, wel-
farist goodness fails to supervene on the assignment of lifetime well-being levels
to persons. Such a supervenience assumption is common ground to every popu-
lation axiology that has been seriously debated by moral philosophers (including
24This is one of the few things on which just about all population axiologists agree. For
example, any form of averagism implies a corresponding ‘Sadistic Conclusion’, according to
which it can be better to add a smaller number of persons with negative well-being than
to ‘add’ a larger number of persons with positive well-being (to a common ‘pre-existing’
population whose members are to be unaffected by any such addition). Perhaps still worse,
according to averagism it can be better to add people with negative well-being than not
to add them, provided only that the pre-existing average is still more negative. This is
not to say that any counterintuitive implication immediately grounds a fatal objection to a
population axiology; that cannot be so, since it is well-known that all population axiologies
have counterintuitive implications (Parfit, 1984; Ng, 1989; Carlson, 1998; Arrhenius, 2000,
n.d.). But the implications of averagism are more intuitively unacceptable than most. For
more on these and other criticisms of averagism, see (Hurka, 1982a,b; Arrhenius, n.d.).
13
timeless averagism). The assumption means, for instance, that if Joe suffers ex-
tra misery in his youth but also extra satisfaction in his middle age, and that
these two changes balance each other out in the sense that Joe’s lifetime well-
being is unaffected, and in addition no-one else’s existence or lifetime well-being
is affected by the change, then overall goodness is unaffected. In contrast, ac-
cording to the instantaneous-averagist axiology VIA, such a change could easily
affect overall value. If the instantaneous population is smaller (resp. larger) at
the time of Joe’s youth than in his middle age, then VIA will attach more weight
(resp. less weight) to increments to Joe’s well-being in youth than in middle
age, so that the change in question is likely to decrease (resp. increase) overall
value according to VIA.25
The supervenience principle discussed in the preceding paragraph is the Pareto
Indifference principle: if states of affairs A and B are equally good for each
person, then they are also equally good simpliciter.26 Closely related to to the
fact that VIA violates the Pareto Indifference principle is fact that it also violates
other (fixed-population) Pareto principles. For example, it violates the Strong
Pareto principle, according to which, if B is better than A for some individual
and worse for no-one, then B is better than A.
The most flagrant way in which VIA violates the Strong Pareto principle con-
cerns premature death. According to VIA, it would constitute an improvement if
anyone whose instantaneous well-being is consistently below average died sooner
rather than later, despite the fact that this would (in most cases) reduce the
lifetime well-being of the victims, while (we may stipulate) it would not increase
the well-being of those who live on. If, for example, at every time there are some
persons at each of the instantaneous well-being levels 100, 101, 102, . . . , 110,
and if in addition a given person’s well-being is constant throughout her life,
VIA implies that it would be better if everyone with well-being levels below 110
died as soon as possible. Particularly when (as we may further stipulate) a well-
being level of 100 corresponds to a life going extremely well, so that premature
death (presumably) constitutes a large reduction in lifetime well-being for the
victim, this is completely implausible.
The Pareto principles for fixed population sizes are among the least controversial
principles of moral philosophy. Even someone who is willing to accept the
25Whether this ‘likely’ condition holds depends on what the relationship is between mo-
mentary and lifetime well-being. The condition stated in the main text follows if lifetime
well-being is simply the time-integral of momentary well-being within the life in question.
On other accounts of that relationship, it could happen that some change (affecting only two
‘times’) leaves Joe’s lifetime well-being unaffected, but increases his momentary well-being at
one time far more than it decreases it at the other affected time, in which case the condition
stated in the main text need not follow.
26I interpret the Pareto principles in terms of betterness, rather than in terms of preferences.
The preference interpretation is more common (in particular, in the economics literature),
but is irrelevant to the present evaluative enterprise, except insofar as the resulting principle
collapses into the betterness-based principle (via assuming a preference-satisfaction theory
of well-being). Broome (1991, p.165) coins the term ’Principle of Personal Good’ for the
‘betterness version’ of the Strong Pareto Principle.
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drawbacks of the timeless averagist axiology should not be willing to accept
these violations of Pareto principles, and thus should not accept instantaneous
averagism.
This is important, since it is fairly common, in the multidisciplinary environment
of the optimum population discussion, for authors implicitly to rely on some-
thing like instantaneous-averagist assumptions. We can disregard any argument
that relies essentially on an instantaneous-averagist axiology. In particular, we
can disregard the argument sketched in section 5.1.1.
It is worth also noting the following more general point. The standard Pareto
principles implicitly assume a fixed population. We can generalise slightly by
requiring merely that the states of affairs being compared contain populations
of the same size, and formulating ‘anonymised’ Pareto principles that disre-
gard any information about personal identities. (For example, the anonymised
Pareto Indifference principle says that if there is a bijection pi from the pop-
ulation in x to the population in y such that for all i ∈ P (x), i’s well-being
in x and pi(i)’s well-being in y are equal, then x and y are equally good.) By
definition, then, any axiology that respects the anonymised Pareto Indifference
principle will judge a transition from A to B to be neither an improvement
nor a disimprovement, if there is a bijection pi between the set of people (ever)
existing in A and the set of people (ever) existing in B, and if in addition this
bijection preserves lifetime well-being levels. Since such bijections can easily fail
to preserve the times at which people live, however, any axiology that assigns
intrinsic importance to time will judge B better than A in some such cases, and
will therefore violate the anonymised Pareto Indifference principle. It will for
that reason be an implausible axiology.27 Despite this, I turn next to investi-
gating a second axiology that assigns intrinsic value to physical time, since it
too is quite popular.
5.2 Second bad argument: Pure discounting
The second axiology (or family of axiologies) I will consider holds that a given
change in well-being (say, due to climate-change impacts) simply matters less,
the further in the future it occurs. Call this the assumption of pure discounting.
Given the assumption of pure discounting, one might try to reason as follows:
even if population spreading does not affect which damaging climate-change
events occur, it does place them further in the (physical) future than they would
27This is of course not to say that no plausible theory of value can judge that mere
(emissions-era) population spreading would result in an improvement, since there are all sorts
of reasons for thinking that such population spreading would in practice affect lifetime well-
being levels, despite the fact that (by stipulation) cumulative emissions are unaffected. I turn
to some of these reasons in section 6.
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otherwise be. Therefore, by pure discounting, it makes their negative impact
on overall value smaller.
As it happens (I claim), the assumption of pure discounting is false. For ex-
ample, as predicted above (since this theory ‘assigns intrinsic importance to
physical time’), it too violates the Pareto Principle, although not quite as fla-
grantly as Instantaneous Averagism (Cowen, 1992),(Greaves, 2017, sec. 7.2).
The plausibility or otherwise of pure discounting is a matter of well-worn de-
bate, which I will not delve into in further detail here.28 But we need not rely on
that somewhat controversial claim here, because the argument I have sketched
fails even if the assumption of pure discounting is granted.
The point is that if we seek to avoid the problems discussed in section 5.1, we
are presumably starting from something like a discounted totalist value func-
tion, rather than a discounted instantaneous-averagist one. According to dis-
counted totalism, the value of a state of affairs is given by the time-integral of
the total amount of discounted instantaneous well-being at each instant of time.




i∈P (x,t) ∆(t) ·
winsti (x, t) , where ∆(t) is the ‘discount factor’ for well-being at time t. Ordinary
(undiscounted) totalism corresponds to the case in which ∆(t) = 1 for all t; oth-
erwise, it is normally assumed that ∆ is a decreasing function of t.) But if this
is the assumed value function, it becomes crucial that emissions-era population
spreading shifts positive contributions to well-being further into the physical fu-
ture, to just the same extent that it shifts climate impacts futurewards. Because
of this, a discounted totalist axiology is actually likely to prefer scenario A to
scenario B: provided only that expected average per-capita well-being at each
time remains positive, it is better by the lights of discounted totalism for more
of it to happen sooner rather than later (in physical time).
28Here I agree with almost all moral philosophers who have written on the topic of dis-
counting (e.g. (Sidgwick, 1890; Cowen & Parfit, 1992; Broome, 2008), and with a healthy
proportion of eminent economists (Ramsey, 1928; Pigou, 1932; Harrod, 1948; Solow, 1974;
Cline, 1992; Dasgupta, 2008; Dietz et al., 2008; Gollier, 2013), although those who dissent are
also in distinguished company (e.g. (Arrow, 1999)). For a survey this debate, see (Greaves,
2017).
As is well known, taking account of exogenous risks of extinction in an expected-value
framework leads to an effect structurally identical to positive pure discounting. This is a
relatively uncontroversial contribution to the discount rate in practice, and the discussion
below can be interpreted purely in terms of the extinction-related discount rate.
In the present context, however, we should note that it is unclear why the pure discount
rate (whether primitive or extinction-risk-related) that we hold fixed across the scenarios of
interest should be a rate relative to physical time, as opposed to relative to population time.
If it is the discount rate relative to population time that is held fixed, a discounted version of
totalism will agree with the undiscounted version that ‘spreading people out in time’, holding
fixed individuals’ well-being levels, amounts to neither an improvement nor a disimprovement.
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6 Instrumental reasons for favouring a physical-
time slowdown
Section 5 surveyed and dismissed some possible reasons for thinking that even
if the assumptions of the simple model set out in section 4.2 were correct, pop-
ulation reduction would lead to an improvement in the state of affairs as far as
considerations of climate change are concerned (i.e. that population reduction
would, in that axiological sense, ‘help with climate change’). I argued that both
of the reasons suggested must be rejected.
The more promising reasons for thinking that population reduction might help
with climate change take the form of reasons for doubting the assumptions of the
model. In this section, I will examine each assumption in turn. In particular, I
will discuss the case for thinking that the first and the third assumptions both
fail. I also flag (in section 6.4) one further way in which population spreading
could affect overall value, via its effects on future instantaneous population sizes.
6.1 (MPS-EE) is false: Effects of emissions-era population
spreading on cumulative emissions
Recall the simple model’s first assumption:
(MPS-EE): Reducing instantaneous population size would implement mere
emissions-era population spreading.
Recall further that (given my definition of ‘mere emissions-era population spread-
ing’) it follows, from this assumption, that reducing instantaneous population
size would not change the lifetime carbon emissions of the nth person, for any
n.
This condition, and hence the assumption that entails it, is false. There are two
reasons why, in reality, reducing instantaneous population size would be likely
to lead to lower per-capita carbon emissions.
First: suppose we hold fixed the assignment of energy consumption rates to
ordinally identified persons. (Suppose, that is, that any development of less
energy-intensive technologies and lifestyles proceeds at a fixed rate in popula-
tion time. We will revisit this assumption shortly.) A given person’s energy
consumption must be met from a (possibly degenerate) combination of fossil
fuel and non-fossil sources. But many of the non-fossil energy sources – for ex-
ample, solar, wind and tidal power – are naturally constrained by physical time.
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The amount of solar energy that can be captured by existing solar panel stocks,
for example, proceeds at a fixed rate in physical time, paying no attention what-
soever to the number of humans who happen to be alive at that or any other
time.29 The upshot of this is that if we practice population spreading during the
period before the achievement of zero carbon emissions, then a higher portion of
the average person’s energy consumption can be met from non-carbon sources
– thus cumulative carbon emissions, and hence peak warming, can be reduced.
The second relevant consideration concerns the pace of research.30 To get to
a zero-carbon economy, we need research and development: assuming that a
return to pre-industrial lifestyles would be unrealistic even if it were desirable,
we need new technologies, to improve energy efficiencies and to decarbonise
energy sources (including building up capacity to harness existing renewable
energy sources), and thus to render something like modern life consistent with
zero net carbon emissions. Since such research work is carried out by people,
and a smaller instantaneous population would inevitably mean fewer researchers
working at any given time, research will inevitably progress more slowly in phys-
ical time if near-term instantaneous population is reduced. This observation,
though, is of limited direct interest; the more relevant question is what the effect
of population spreading would be on the pace of research progress in population
time. If population spreading would speed up the relevant research and devel-
opment relative to population time, then this would provide a second mechanism
that tends to reduce the emissions of a given ordinally identified person, and
thus tends to reduce cumulative emissions.
This more relevant question is also substantially more complicated. On the one
hand, there are some benefits to research projects and sub-projects being carried
out in series rather than in parallel, so that later (sub-)projects can learn from
and utilise the successes and failures of earlier ones; this consideration tends to
lead to faster (population-time) research progress in scenarios involving lower
instantaneous populations. On the other hand, though, the proportion of the
population employed in research and development is presumably an increasing
function of instantaneous population size, due to economies of scale elsewhere in
the economy, and this consideration points in the opposite direction. (To take
an extreme illustrative case: a world population of 10 would have its work cut
out merely producing enough food for self-sustenance, and would be unlikely to
support any research into the efficiency of solar panels.)
29Of course, solar panel stocks (and their efficiency) can be increased, and, since such
improvements are generated by people, rates of increase depend somewhat on population size.
This is an important dependency; I return to it in the next paragraph. But (i) at some point
the natural limits, and hence the physical-time flow rate of available energy, become relevant,
and (ii) the current level of technology and capital is fixed, so that at least for the near term
the flow of harnessable renewable energy is approximately independent of feasible variations
in instantaneous population size.
30Here, I discuss research in the service of mitigation. Similar considerations apply to
research in the service of adaptation; cf. section 6.3.
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We have, then, one set of considerations favouring the hypothesis that near-
term population spreading would reduce cumulative emissions, and a second
set whose sign is unclear. It is also unclear what the sign is of the net effect
when both sets of considerations are combined. My own guess is that the effect
of increasing the quota of renewable energy per person is greater than the net
effect of population reduction on population-time research progress, so that one
should indeed expect population reduction to reduce cumulative emissions. But
this guess is based neither on hard data nor on rigorous theory, and there is
scope for reasonable disagreement.
6.2 (CE-PH): Cumulative emissions and peak warming
The simple model’s second assumption was that
(CE-PH) Peak warming is determined by cumulative emissions alone.
For present purposes, two limitations of the scientific case for this claim should
be flagged.
Firstly, the models employed by the literature in question, and correspondingly
the conclusion (CE-PH), apply only to emissions pathways for carbon dioxide,
not to emissions pathways for GHGs in full generality. This is of some im-
portance in the context of my discussion: emissions rates may well have more
direct significance for shorter-lived GHGs, notably methane31. The reason for
focussing nonetheless on carbon dioxide is that in practice CO2 emissions con-
stitute the majority of GHG emissions by a significant margin, on a wide variety
of metrics, so that conclusions we reach on the basis of considering carbon alone
are likely to be reasonably close approximations to the full story. In particular,
Bowerman (2013, esp. fig. 7.5) shows that in e.g. the RCP4.5 emissions sce-
nario32, for emissions in each of the next few decades, the contribution of CO2
31For example: since carbon dioxide is a particularly long-lived greenhouse gas, making
moderate reductions to the emissions rate while preserving cumulative emissions would not
significantly affect peak CO2 concentrations. But the same cannot be said for methane. It
is not immediately obvious what significance (if any) such variables as peak concentrations
have: this issue depends on the details of the climate system, and would be most naturally
dealt with by a fresh modelling exercise. But since the relationship between atmospheric GHG
concentrations and warming effects is not in general linear, they could easily be significant.
32Much of the literature on climate change, including the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report,
focusses analysis on a standardised set of emissions scenarios (‘representative concentration
pathways’, or RCPs): RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.0. The number following the
letters ‘RCP’ is the level of radiative forcing in 2100 that is postulated by the scenario in
question (in Wm−2, relative to pre-industrial times); thus lower numbers correspond to more
mitigation, and higher numbers to more warming. The scenario RCP4.5 has emissions peak
around 2040, and is a fairly ‘middle of the road’ scenario.
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emissions to peak warming is around four times the contribution from emissions
of all other GHGs combined.
Secondly, even restricting attention to carbon emissions alone, the evidence for
(CE-PH) consists in considering relatively modest perturbations to a chosen ‘sta-
tus quo’ emissions pathway (for fixed cumulative emissions), and noting that
when climate models are run with these perturbed emissions pathways as inputs,
the output temperature pathway exhibits essentially unchanged peak warming.
It is an open question what the limits of validity of the claim (CE-PH) are, when
more radical variations in the emissions pathway (still holding fixed cumulative
emissions) are considered. Heuristically, there are some physical-scientific rea-
sons for suspecting that sufficiently radical variations in emissions timing would
in fact break the link between cumulative emissions and peak warming (stem-
ming from the fact within a few decades of CO2 emissions, a significant propor-
tion of the emitted CO2 is absorbed by the land and oceans ((IPCC, 2013, Box
6.1, pp.472-3). However, since realistically achievable variations in the popula-
tion pathway are also relatively modest (for example, the differences between the
UN high/medium/low pouplation projections), no achievable amount of popu-
lation reduction is likely to take us outside the domain of validity of the claim
(CE-PH).
6.3 (PH-CI) is false: Effects of population spreading on
adaptation
Even if (contra the tentative conclusion of section 6.1) population spreading has
no effect on cumulative emissions and hence (according to (CE-PH)) on peak
warming, it is all but certain to reduce the (physical-time) emissions rate, and
hence the (physical-time) rate of warming. This could be important, because
some of the routes by which climate change is expected to lead to impacts on
well-being are sensitive, in particular, specifically to the physical-time rate of
temperature change.
Consider, for instance, species migration. One of the expected damaging effects
of climate change is species extinction. And one prominent expected route to
species extinction is the geographical migration of climate, proceeding at a pace
that outstrips that at which the species itself is able to migrate, so that species
are unable to keep up with the migration of what would otherwise be their
viable habitat. Thus, for example, tree species, rodents, freshwater molluscs
and carnivorous mammals can migrate at speeds up to about (respectively)
1km/decade, 12km/decade, 30km/decade and 60 km/decade. Meanwhile, pro-
jected climate velocities (depending on type of habitat, as well as emissions
scenario) can easily be as high as 10-20km/decade, and could possibly be as
high as 70km/decade, so that there is a real threat of some of these species
being rendered extinct simply by their inability to keep up with the physical
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pace of climate migration (IPCC, 2014a, p.15). The point here is that the fixed
maximum speed at which a species is able to migrate is a speed relative to
physical time, not to population time. (If rodents are able to migrate at a speed
of 12km per physical decade, that would generally continue to be the case in a
scenario in which the instantaneous human population doubled or halved; for
instance, rodents would not suddenly develop an ability to migrate at 24km per
physical year just because twice as many humans were on the planet.)
For another example, take agricultural outputs. Experts estimate that temper-
ature increases of 2◦C or more would be likely significantly to decrease yields of
several major food crops, such as wheat, rice and maize (IPCC, 2014a, p.17).
Adaptation to this impact might consist in genetically engineering higher-yield
crops to offset or reverse the damage, and/or in switching to new foodstuffs
that are more suited to growing in the new climate regime. Although this is less
clear than in the case of species migration, it is also plausible that these adap-
tation processes, too, are at least somewhat constrained by physical as opposed
to population time (for instance, because one round of experimentation with a
new crop takes one physical growing season, independently of population size).
The general picture is that (1) to at least some significant extent, what is dam-
aging about climate change is that it is a change we would need to adapt to,
rather than necessarily that a resulting warmer climate would in the long run be
forever worse than a cooler one. Meanwhile, (2) adaptation processes are often
limited by rates in physical time in addition to (or, as in the case of species
migration, instead of) being limited by rates in population time. To the extent
that these two things are true, population spreading would be likely to reduce
climate impacts even if it left cumulative emissions, and thus peak warming,
unaffected. The simple model’s assumption (PH-CI) is false.
It is perhaps worth noting that this latter explanation of how population spread-
ing might reduce climate-change impacts is one that would not be captured
by standard integrated assessment models of climate change, in their present
forms. This is because the explanation essentially depends on the claim that
the magnitude of climate damage at a given time t is positively related to the
time-derivative of ∆T (t), not only to ∆T (t) itself (where ∆T (t) is the tem-
perature rise at t, relative to some specified baseline date t0 (e.g., 1990). In
contrast, the standard damage functions in both the MERGE model (Manne
& Richels, 2004) and the DICE models ((Nordhaus, 2008, p.205),(Nordhaus &
Sztorc, 2013, p.10)), for instance, hypothesise that climate damages at t are
simply a quadratic function of ∆T (t).
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6.4 Effects of population spreading on future population
size
Another relevant consideration is that in practice, changes to the instantaneous
population size during the emissions era would inevitably bring about changes
to the population size during the times at which climate impacts are suffered.
This is another route by which population spreading could affect the magnitude
of climate damages, in evaluative terms, even without affecting impacts at a
more purely physical level of description (e.g., the number and physical severity
of floods). A given flood, for instance, causes more damage if there are more
people around to be affected by it.
This at first sight might seem to suggest a further argument for the claim
that population reduction would generate a climate-change-related improve-
ment. The argument would run as follows: population reduction in the short
to medium term would in practice result in lower population sizes during cli-
mate impacts; hence (for fixed climate impacts) it would lead to lower climate
damages (in the sense of: lower climate-induced reductions in total well-being);
hence it would generate a climate-change-related improvement.
This argument, though, is too quick. The comparisons it alludes to involve not
two, but four states of affairs: high and low population scenarios, with and
without climate change. The observation in this argument is that the value
difference between the ‘high population, no climate change’ scenario and the
‘high population, climate change’ scenario is greater than the value difference
between the ‘low population, no climate change’ scenario and the ‘low popula-
tion, climate change’ scenario, when climate impacts are held fixed. And this
is correct, insofar as ‘climate impacts’ are effects on average well-being. In that
sense, reducing population (while holding fixed climate impacts) would reduce
‘climate damages’. But it does not follow that the ‘high population, climate
change’ scenario is worse than the ‘low population, climate change’ scenario.
The latter comparison is the one of interest for practical purposes, since of
course we cannot turn off climate change.
Would it in fact be better to have smaller population sizes in the future, when
climate impacts are suffered? This question is of a piece with the more general
question of optimum instantaneous population size, and has nothing in par-
ticular to do with climate change. It therefore lies outside the scope of this
paper.
7 Conclusions
A common line of thought identifies increasing human population size as one of
the key drivers of climate change. The argument for this appears at first sight to
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be simple: climate change is driven by GHG emissions, and, when average per
capita emissions rates are held fixed, the global GHG emission rate is propor-
tional to population size, so that at least in one clear sense, higher population
means ‘higher emissions’. In this paper I have argued that while this is true,
that sense of ‘higher emissions’ is of limited direct significance for the purpose
of climate damages, so that the simple argument is misguided. Given the close
physical relationship between degrees of warming and cumulative emissions, a
more illuminating approach conceptualises increases and decreases in instanta-
neous population size in terms of speeding up or slowing down (what I have
called) ‘population time’, relative to ordinary physical time. This conceptu-
alisation makes clear that the key questions concern (1) the extent to which
‘emissions-era population spreading’ – that is, reducing instantaneous popula-
tion size, and thus spreading out the people who will live before the goal of
‘zero net carbon emissions’ is attained more thinly over physical time – would
in practice reduce cumulative emissions, and (2) the extent to which climate
impacts at a given time are functions of the time-derivative of temperature,
rather than only of the number of degrees of temperature rise itself. There are
in the end credible reasons, from each of these two directions, for thinking that
population reduction would indeed reduce climate-change impacts. But they
are not reasons that are visible in the simple argument; they are significantly
more subtle (and less conclusive) than the simple argument recognises.
Even if it is in the end correct that population reduction would help with climate
change, this is of course not to say that a lower instantaneous population in the
medium term would be better all things considered, because climate change
is of course not the only relevant consideration for this general question. In
particular, in this paper I have not considered:
1. The effects of instantaneous population size on average instantaneous well-
being. Here there are two competing sets of considerations. On the one
hand, economies of scale tend to favour larger populations. This is the
dominant consideration at sufficiently low population sizes. On the other,
beyond a certain population size, the more relevant consideration concerns
fixed factors that cannot simply be scaled up to keep pace with popula-
tion (for example, land area), and that eventually generate diseconomies of
scale, together with the possibility of e.g. conflict over increasingly scarce
resources. It is not clear (even approximately) which instantaneous popu-
lation size would maximise average instantaneous well-being (in practice,
given current conditions). There are also dynamic considerations, stem-
ming from the effects of population growth rates (as opposed to population
sizes) on dependency ratios.
2. Non-climate routes by which instantaneous population size may affect
environmental degradation, and thereby affect future population sizes
and/or well-being levels. Relevant considerations here include biodiver-
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sity, air pollution, soil fertility, deforestation, groundwater, and fuel and
mineral supplies.
3. The effects of instantaneous population size on the timeless population
size. From the point of view of many theories of population axiology —
specifically, theories that favour larger over smaller timeless populations
when average well-being levels are held fixed — these effects are potentially
very important to the general question of which instantaneous population
size is optimal. Again there are two competing sets of considerations.
On the one hand, insofar as the time profile of extinction risks for hu-
manity is independent of near-term instantaneous population size, there
is a ceteris paribus advantage to larger instantaneous populations: under
that condition, larger instantaneous populations correspond to larger ex-
pected timeless population sizes. On the other hand, there are various
mechanisms via which larger instantaneous populations in the short to
medium term might increase anthropogenic extinction risks, and might
thus decrease the expected size of the timeless population.
It is of course increasingly fashionable to claim that the world is ‘overpopulated’
in an all-things-considered sense, climate change merely providing one reason
among a highly overdetermined case for thinking so. And this may be correct.
But such claims are rarely based on sober analysis, and still more rarely are they
sensitive to the highly relevant vagaries of population axiology (in particular,
to the sense in which many axiologies assign intrinsic disvalue to population
reduction). These are extremely complex matters, which I have not attempted
to settle here. The aim of this paper has been only to clarify one piece of the
jigsaw.
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